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                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-1484
________________
JUNAIDY PRANATA,
                                                 Petitioner
   v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; DIRECTOR OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL OFFICE,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
DIRECTOR OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL OFFICE,
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY FIELD OFFICE OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
_____________________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A96-261-516
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Daniel A. Meisner)
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
Filed: August 29, 2008
___________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________
2PER CURIAM.
Junaidy Pranata, an Indonesian native and citizen, petitions for review of a final
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial by the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of Pranata’s application for asylum, withholding of removal and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Before the IJ, Pranata testified to
several incidents of alleged persecution based on his Chinese heritage and his practice of
Catholicism.  The IJ found that Pranata was ineligible for asylum because the incidents he
testified to did not constitute past persecution, he failed to establish that  had a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  The IJ also found that Pranata did not meet his
burden of proof under the CAT.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s conclusions and dismissed
the appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where the BIA substantially
adopts the findings of the IJ, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  He
Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).
The IJ and BIA’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.  Pranata
testified to three incidents which he claims show past persecution.  First, Pranata testified
to a bicycle accident which occurred when he was seven years old.  According to Pranata,
a native Indonesian hit him with his bicycle and after the accident Pranata was refused
medical assistance because he was Chinese.  As another example, Pranata testified that
when he was in high school, he was in another accident with a native Indonesian.  Pranata
3claimed that after the accident, a crowd surrounded the scene of the accident and accosted
him but that it dispersed when the police arrived.  Pranata alleged that these same
policemen then asked him for money for their assistance.  Pranata also testified to an
incident during which Indonesian natives surrounded his car, demanded money from him,
and pelted the car with rocks.  Finally, Pranata described, without specificity, attacks on
Catholic churches in Indonesia by Muslims and incidents during which he was badgered
and “beat up” because of his Catholicism.  
 We have endorsed the definition of persecution as “threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  “[O]rdinary criminal activity
does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum.”
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001).  Although Pranata encountered
some unfortunate incidents in his youth, those incidents were not of the severity necessary
to prove persecution.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that
random acts of robbery and assault resulting in minor injuries cannot be characterized as
acts of persecution).  Nor did Pranata show that these incidents were the result of
governmental action.  See id. at 537.  Additionally, Pranata failed to tie many aspects of
these incidents to individualized persecution based on ethnicity or religion.  Thus, we do
not find that the evidence presented by Pranata is “so compelling that no reasonable fact
4finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 483-84 (1992). 
The BIA’s conclusion that Pranata failed to prove a well-founded fear of future
persecution is also supported by substantial evidence.  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen.,
527 F.3d 330, 345 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing future persecution standard).  As the IJ
noted, Pranata had family members who remained in Indonesia unharmed since his
departure.  We have held that “when family members remain in petitioner’s native
country without meeting harm, and there is no individualized showing that petitioner
would be singled out for persecution, the reasonableness of a petitioner’s well-founded
fear of future persecution is diminished.”  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537.  Pranata also submitted
multiple periodical articles, and the 2004 Country Report for Indonesia issued by the State
Department to bolster his claim of well-founded fear of future persecution.  While the
report contains accounts of anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment in Indonesia, such
racism and discrimination do not appear to rise to the level of systematic and pervasive
persecution.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Because Pranata failed to make out an asylum claim, he necessarily failed to
satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Furthermore, Pranata’s application for relief under
CAT was also justifiably denied.  Pranata failed to show that it is more likely than not that
he would be tortured by the Indonesian government or that the government would
5acquiesce in any torture.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473
F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2005).
For the above-stated reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
